SUBPOENA ISSUED - FOREIGN SHERIFFNAME:DANIELLE PRITCHARDPAYEE ADDRESS:1963 LINDEN AVENUEZANESVILLE, OH 43701COUNTY DESC:FRANKLIN COUNTYSTATE ID:OHRECORDS ONLY IND:NRETURNED - NOT EXECUTED May 15, 2023 (2024)

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RAVNEET KAUR Vs JAY BLEVINS VS.JAY BLEVINS ET AL

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SUSAN HOFFMANNBECK Vs LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE VS.LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE ET AL

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Aug 16, 2024 |ANDRIA C NOBLE |PERSONAL INJURY |24 CV 006376

Ruling

FEDERICO REYES GARCIA, ET AL. VS OASIS PIZZA INC., WHICH DBA DOMINO'S PIZZA, DOMINO'S PIZZA LOCATED AT 21001 SHERMAN WAY, SUITE 6, CANOGA PARK, CALIFORNIA 913

Aug 20, 2024 |20STCV26256

Case Number: 20STCV26256 Hearing Date: August 20, 2024 Dept: 32 PLEASE NOTE: Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that partys intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsels contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. TENTATIVE RULING DEPT: 32 HEARING DATE: August 20, 2024 CASE NUMBER: 20STCV26256 MOTIONS: Motion for Order Granting Relief and Setting Aside Dismissal MOVING PARTY: Plaintiffs Frederico Reyes Garcia and Maria Rodriguez OPPOSING PARTY: Unopposed BACKGROUND On July 10, 2020, Plaintiffs Frederico Reyes Garcia and Maria Rodriguez (Plaintiffs) filed a complaint against Oasis Pizza Inc, Zack Roberts, and Does 1 to 50 for negligence, negligent entrustment, and negligent hiring, supervision, and retention. The case revolves around an alleged motor vehicle accident. On January 25, 2024, at an Order to Show Cause re: monetary sanctions for failure to enter default judgments/ dismissal for failure to enter default judgments, counsel for Plaintiffs did not appear. There was also no communication to the Court as to why there were no appearances. Then, pursuant to an oral request by Defendant, the Court ordered the complaint dismissed with prejudice. (Min. Order, 1/25/24.) On July 25, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion to set aside the dismissal under Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b). Specially Appearing Defendant So-Cal Dominoids, Inc. has filed a notice of conditional non-opposition requesting that if the motion is granted, it shall have 15 days to file a Motion to Dismiss that was previously taken off-calendar after the dismissal was entered. LEGAL STANDARD Under Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b), the Court may relieve a party from a dismissal taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. This application must be filed no more than six months after entry of the order from which relief is sought, and must contain an affidavit of fault demonstrating the moving partys mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. A mistake is a basis for relief under section 473 when by reason of the mistake a party failed to make a timely response. Surprise occurs when a party is unexpectedly placed in a position to his injury without any negligence of his own. Excusable neglect is a basis for relief when the party has shown some reasonable excuse for the default. (Credit Managers Association of California v. National Independent Business Alliance (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 1166, 1173; Davis v. Thayer (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 892, 905.) Under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating an excusable ground, such as fraud or mistake, justifying a courts vacating a judgment. (Basinger v. Roger & Wells (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 16, 2324.) A party who seeks relief under section 473 on the basis of mistake or inadvertence of counsel must demonstrate that such mistake, inadvertence, or general neglect was excusable because the negligence of the attorney is imputed to his client and may not be offered by the latter as a basis for relief. [Citation.] In determining whether the attorney's mistake or inadvertence was excusable, the court inquires whether a reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circ*mstances might have made the same error. [Citation.] In other words, the discretionary relief provision of section 473 only permits relief from attorney error fairly imputable to the client, i.e., mistakes anyone could have made. [Citation.] Conduct falling below the professional standard of care, such as failure to timely object or to properly advance an argument, is not therefore excusable. To hold otherwise would be to eliminate the express statutory requirement of excusability and effectively eviscerate the concept of attorney malpractice. (Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 249, 258 [finding excusable mistake where counsel provided a settlement offer for judgment against his client, as opposed to in favor of, since this was a clerical mistake].) However, mere neglect or negligence is not a sufficient ground for relief. (Cochran v. Linn (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 245, 25152 [finding unexcused neglect where party failed to provide evidence that it possessed months before, in opposition to a summary judgment motion]; Martin v. Johnson (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 595, 606607 [no abuse of discretion in refusing to vacate summary judgment due to attorney's error in submitting declarations not within the personal knowledge of the declarant].) Relief under section 473(b) is mandatory when based on an attorney affidavit of fault; otherwise, it is discretionary. With an attorney affidavit of fault, there is no requirement that the attorneys mistake or inadvertence be excusable. (Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 770.) The affidavit also does not need to contain a reason for the mistake. (Martin Potts & Associates, Inc. v. Corsair, LLC (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 432, 438.) However mandatory relief is only available when a party fails to oppose a dismissal motion (which are procedurally equivalent to a default). (Leader v. Health Industries of America, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 603, 620.) The mandatory relief provision does not apply to dismissals for failure to prosecute [citations omitted], dismissals for failure to serve a complaint within three years [citations omitted], dismissals based on running of the statute of limitations [citations omitted], and voluntary dismissals entered pursuant to settlement [citations omitted], as well as discretionary dismissals based on the failure to file an amended complaint after a demurrer has been sustained with leave to amend, at least where, as here, the dismissal was entered after a hearing on noticed motions which required the court to evaluate the reasons for delay in determining how to exercise its discretion. (Id.) DISCUSSION Procedurally, the present motion is timely because it was filed exactly six months after the case was dismissed. The Declaration of Fred Hanassab, Plaintiffs counsel (Counsel), states the following: [m]y mistake, surprise, inadvertence, and/or excusable neglect was the reason for Plaintiffs failure to appear at the January 25, 2024 Order to Show Cause Hearings, which was caused by a technical error within my office, leading to the hearings not being calendared in my office calendar. (Hanassab Decl. ¶ 5.) The Court grants the motion to set aside the dismissal. Specially Appearing Defendant, So Cal Dominoids, Inc., may file a motion to dismiss. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs Motion for Order Granting Setting Aside Dismissal. An Order to Show Cause Re Monetary Sanctions up to $1000/ Dismissal for failure to enter default judgments is set for September 25, 2024 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 32 of the Spring Street Courthouse. Default packages must be filed five court days in advance. Plaintiffs to provide notice and file a proof of service of such.

Ruling

California Casualty Indemnity Exchange vs Mark Green

Aug 21, 2024 |23CV-01945

23CV-01945 California Casualty Indemnity Exchange v. Mark GreenTrial Setting ConferenceAppearance required. Parties who wish to appear remotely must contact the clerk of thecourt at (209) 725-4111 to seek permission and arrange for a remote appearance.Appear to set trial.

Ruling

ESTATE OF SHANE H. MINASSIAN, ET AL. VS DARIUSH G. ADLI, ET AL.

Aug 20, 2024 |22STCV41042

Case Number: 22STCV41042 Hearing Date: August 20, 2024 Dept: 54 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Estate of Shane H. Minassian aka Shahen Minassian, Shahin Minassian, By Executor Arthur Minassian Plaintiffs, Case No.: 22STCV41042 vs. Tentative Ruling Dariush G. Adli; Datev Shenian; Safarian Choi & Bolstad, LLP; David Bolstad, and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive Defendants. Hearing Date: August 20, 2024 Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter Motion to Lift Stay and for Relief from Unaffordable Arbitration Fees Moving Party: Plaintiff and Executor Arthur Minassian on behalf of Estate of Shane H. Minassian Responding Party: Defendants Dariush G. Adli; Datev Shenian; David Bolstad; Safarian Choi; and Bolstad, LLP, Jointly T/R: PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO LIFT STAY AND BE RELIEVED FROM ARBITRATION FEES IS DENIED. PLAINTIFF(S) TO NOTICE. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at¿SMCdept54@lacourt.org¿with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:30 am on the day of the hearing. The Court considers the moving papers, opposition, and reply. BACKGROUND On December 30, 2022, Plaintiff and Successor-In-Interest, Arthur Minassian brought a survival action following his fathers death, Decedent Shane H. Minassian, aka Shehen Minassian for two counts of legal malpractice against Defendants Daruish G. Adli and Datev Shenian and David Bolstad and Safarian Choi & Bolstad, LLP. On June 20, 2023, the Adli Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the contract between the Adli Defendants and Decedent. On September 20, 2023, the Court granted the Adli Defendants motion to compel arbitration and ordered the case to binding arbitration. Plaintiff moves to lift the stay and for relief from arbitration fees. ANALYSIS [W]hen a party who has engaged in arbitration in good faith is unable to afford to continue in such a forum, that party may seek relief from the superior court. If sufficient evidence is presented on these issues, and the court concludes the partys financial status is not a result of the partys intentional attempt to avoid arbitration, the court may issue an order specifying: (1) the arbitration shall continue so long as the other party to the arbitration agrees to pay, or the arbitrator orders it to pay, all fees and costs of the arbitration; and (2) if neither of those occur, the arbitration shall be deemed had and the case may proceed in the superior court. (Weiler v. Marcus Millichap Real Est. Inv. Servs. Inc., 22 Cal.App.5th 970, 981, 232 Cal. Rptr. 3d 155, 164 (2018). Plaintiff seeks to lift the stay of proceedings and order Defendants to choose either to pay Plaintiffs share of arbitration fees and costs, or to waive the right to arbitrate. Plaintiff brings the motion pursuant to Aronrow v. Superior Court (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 865, 886, Weiler v. Marcus & Millichap Real Est. Inv. Servs., Inc. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 970, 981, and Hang v RG Legacy I, LLC (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1243 on the grounds that Plaintiff, the estate of Decedent, has no assets and no sources of income. In reply, Plaintiff points to LewWilliams v. Petrosian (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 97, 111, decided after Plaintiff filed this motion, in which the Court of Appeal ruled that the proper remedy for a litigant who asserts the inability to pay an arbitrator is to present the issue to the arbitrator. The Court agrees. (The issue of Plaintiffs ability to pay arbitration fees was not raised in the motion to compel arbitration in this case.) The motion is denied without prejudice.

Ruling

Padilla, et al. vs. Rawlins, et al.

Aug 19, 2024 |23CV-0202171

PADILLA, ET AL. VS. RAWLINS, ET AL.Case Number: 23CV-0202171Tentative Ruling on Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint: This matter is oncalendar for further proceedings on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint.The amendment is the addition of Franchisor British Petroleum West Coast Products, LLC as aDoe Defendant. The matter has been properly noticed, with proof of service on file. The Motionis unopposed.Merits of Motion: CCP § 473(a)(1) permits any pleading to be amended in furtherance of justiceand on any terms as may be proper, after notice to the adverse party. The Court’s discretion in thisregard will usually be exercised liberally to permit amendment. Nestle v. Santa Monica (1972) 6Cal. 3d 920, 939. Leave to amend should be liberally granted so long as there is no statute oflimitations issue or prejudice to the opposing party. Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56Cal.4th 203, 240.Here, no party opposes the motion, no trial date is set, and discovery is ongoing. Defendants havenot alleged any prejudice based on the amendment, and it does not appear any will result. TheMotion is GRANTED. A proposed order has been lodged and will be executed. Plaintiff isgranted ten days leave to file the First Amended Complaint; it will not be deemed filed.****************************************************************************** 9:00 a.m. Review Hearings******************************************************************************

Ruling

MICHAEL SAPIR, TRUSTEE OF THE BEN AND CELIA SAPIR FAMILY TRUST VS ED W. PILOT, ESQ, ET AL.

Aug 20, 2024 |23SMCV01292

Case Number: 23SMCV01292 Hearing Date: August 20, 2024 Dept: 205 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles West District Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 MICHAEL SAPIR, as trustee of the Ben and Celia Sapir Family Trust, Plaintiff, v. ED W. PILOT, et al., Defendants. Case No.: 23SMCV01292 Hearing Date: August 20, 2024 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO SET ASIDE DISMISSAL BACKGROUND This is a legal malpractice case. Plaintiff Michael Sapir alleges his former attorney, Ed W. Pilot failed to timely file a complaint, within the applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiff is appearing in pro per. On January 3, 2024, the Court held a case management conference (CMC) and an OSC hearing on why sanctions should not be imposed for Plaintiffs failure to file a proof of service. Plaintiff did not attend the hearing, and accordingly, the Court dismissed the action without prejudice. This hearing is on Plaintiffs motion to vacate the dismissal. Plaintiff argues that relief should be granted because (1) he mistakenly believed a licensed attorney would attend the January 3, 2024 hearing and provide the Court assurances that the lawsuit would be diligently prosecuted; (2) he was surprised counsel failed to appear; (3) his failure to appear was due to excusable neglect as his actions were that of a reasonably prudent person under the same circ*mstances given assurances by the attorney that he would represent Plaintiff; (4) he contracted COVID and could not attend the hearing personally, and (5) he did not know he could appear remotely. There was no opposition filed as of the posting of this tentative ruling. LEGAL STANDARD Pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. §473(b), both discretionary and mandatory relief are available to parties when a case is dismissed. Discretionary relief is available under the statute as the court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 473(b).) Alternatively, mandatory relief is available when accompanied by an attorneys sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect. (Id.) The purpose of the attorney affidavit provision is to relieve the innocent client of the burden of the attorneys fault, to impose the burden on the erring attorney, and to avoid precipitating more litigation in the form of malpractice suits. (Hu v. Fang (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 61, 64.) Mandatory relief is available even if counsels neglect was inexcusable. (SJP Limited Partnership v. City of Los Angeles (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 511, 516517.) An application for discretionary or mandatory relief must be made no more than six months after entry of the judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding from which relief is sought. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473(b); English v. IKON Business Solutions (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 130, 143.) [W]hen relief under section 473¿is¿available, there is a strong¿public¿policy¿in¿favor¿of granting relief and allowing the requesting party his or her day in court[.] (Rappleyea v. Campbell¿(1994) 8 Cal. 4th 975, 981-82.) Any doubt in applying section 473, subdivision (b), must be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief. (Bonzer v. City of Huntington Park (1993) 20 Cal. App. 4th 1474,¿1477-1478.) Where relief is promptly sought and no prejudice would be done to the opposing party, only very slight evidence is required to justify the setting¿aside of a default. For this reason, orders denying relief under section 473 are carefully scrutinized on appeal. (¿Rappleyea v. Campbell¿(1994) 8 Cal..4th 975, 980;¿Elston v. City of Turlock¿(1985) 38 Cal.3d 227, 233.) DISCUSSION The mandatory relief provision of §473(b) refers to both default judgment or dismissal. The inclusion of dismissal by the Legislature was intended to put plaintiffs whose cases are dismissed for failing to respond to a dismissal motion on the same footing with defendants who are defaulted for failing to respond to an action. (Jackson v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 166, 175.). However, although the language of the mandatory provision, on its face, affords relief from unspecified dismissals caused by attorney neglect, our courts have, through judicial construction, prevented it from being used indiscriminately by plaintiffs attorneys as a perfect escape hatch to undo dismissals of civil cases. (Nacimiento Regional Water Management Advisory Committee v. Monterey County Water Resources Agency (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 961, 967.) Courts have construed the provision as reaching only dismissals that are procedurally equivalent to a default. (Jackson, 32 Cal.App.4th at 174.) Dismissals that are sufficiently distinct from a default, thereby falling outside the scope of the mandatory provision, include dismissals for failure to prosecute, dismissals for failure to serve a complaint within three years, dismissals based on running of the statute of limitations and voluntary dismissals entered pursuant to settlement. (Leader v. Health Industries of America Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 603, 620.) Here, the dismissal was for failure to prosecute, namely that Plaintiff failed to file a proof of service. In addition, there is no attorney at fault affidavit. Accordingly, Plaintiff is not entitled to mandatory relief. However, the Court concludes Plaintiff is entitled to discretionary relief. Discretionary relief is available where there is mistake, inadvertence, surprise or neglect. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 473(b).) The mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect¿must¿be reasonable¿to justify discretionary relief.¿ (Conway v. Municipal Court¿(1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 1009, 1017; see¿Carroll v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc.¿(1982) 32 Cal.3d 892, 898.) Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff reasonably believed he would be represented by counsel, and that counsel would appear at the January 3, 2024 hearing on his behalf. (Sapir Decl. ¶¶ 4-6.) His mistake, surprise and excusable neglect were reasonable under the circ*mstances, given counsels assurances that he would represent Plaintiff. (Id. ¶4.) A reasonable person under the same circ*mstances would have acted as Plaintiff did. In addition, Plaintiff could not appear in person at the hearing in any event because he contracted COVID, and when he attempted to appear remotely, he was told his case had already been called and dismissed. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 8.) Given the strong policy favoring a resolution of cases on their merits, the Court grants the motion to set aside dismissal. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs motion to set aside dismissal. The action is reinstated. The Court sets a case management conference for September 23, 2024 at 9:00 a.m. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: August 20, 2024 ___________________________ Edward B. Moreton, Jr. Judge of the Superior Court

Ruling

VALENZUELA vs MENJIVAR

Aug 20, 2024 |CVSW2310366

MOTION TO COMPEL BY MARIACVSW2310366 VALENZUELA VS MENJIVARMENJIVARTentative Ruling: GRANT. Mr. Torres is to make himself available for a deposition within 30days of this order. DENY sanctions because the circ*mstances are unjust given that the court hasmade itself available for an informal discovery conference. If Mr. Torres fails to appear a secondtime, then the moving party should request an IDC. If after further intervention Mr. Torres refusesto cooperate, then the court will likely award full sanctions (to include attorney’s fees and costs).

Ruling

Janet Mlynar vs California Earthquake Authority, et al

Aug 20, 2024 |19CV03844

19CV03844MLYNAR v. CALIFORNIA EARTHQUAKE AUTHORITY et al PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER Plaintiff’s motion for a protective order is denied. “Where a party must resort to thecourts, ‘the burden is on the party seeking the protective order to show good cause for whateverorder is sought.’ [Citation.]” (Nativi v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2016) 223Cal.App.4th 261, 318.) Plaintiff has not demonstrated good cause for a protective order to haltthe deposition of David Bonowitz. I. BACKGROUND AND MOTION This case stems from the 2014 Napa earthquake. Plaintiff Janet Mlynar’s (“Mlynar”)home was insured for earthquake damage by CEA and CSAA. CEA issued a homeowner’spolicy to Mlynar thought its participating insurer, CSAA. After the earthquake, Mlynarsubmitted an earthquake claim under the CEA policy. Defendant Ronald Cook is an attorneyretained by CSAA to assist regarding the earthquake claim. The claim, for a variety of contestedreasons, was not resolved right away but instead there were numerous inspections regarding thescope and extent of the alleged damage to the home. Checks were issued to Mlynar but nevernegotiated by her, and again, the reasons why are in dispute. The claim also went through anappraisal process. In March 2023, defendant CEA subpoenaed certain documents of Mr. Bonowitz, astructural engineer who was previously hired by Mlynar in 2016; a copy of the subpoena wasserved on plaintiff’s counsel. Mr. Bonowitz produced the documents requested. Mlynar did notobject. (Dec. of Amato ¶ 3.) CEA then noticed his deposition, serving the notice on April 24,2024. Mlynar did not object. (Dec. of Amato at ¶ 5, Ex. 4.) The deposition began on May 10,2024, and lasted about an hour before Mr. Dobrin, Mlynar’s counsel, halted the deposition,stating Mlynar’s former counsel, Mr. Greenburg, may have intended Mr. Bonowitz to beconsidered a retained expert and that his [Mr. Bonowitz’s] prior work on the case was part ofconfidential settlement negotiations. He indicated his intention to move for a protective order.Mlynar filed this motion on July 18, 2024. Mlynar moves for a protective order pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section2025.420, subd. (a)-(b), seeking an order that the deposition of Mr. Bonowitz, not take placeunless Mlynar discloses him as an expert witness for trial. Mlynar asserts a protective order is Page 1 of 6necessary to protect her from “unwarranted annoyance”, “oppression”, or “undue burden”. Shecontends Mr. Bonowitz was her expert consultant for the sole purpose of confidential settlementcommunications with CEA and CSAA. According to Mlynar, during the claim’s adjustmentprocess, the parties’ experts attempted to agree upon a “repair protocol” so that she could receiveCEA funds to start repairs on her home. The parties could not reach an agreement and proceededthrough the JAMS appraisal process. Mr. Dobrin attaches the following in support of Mlynar’s motion, along with requests forjudicial notice: • Exhibit A is an 11/22/16 email from Mr. Greenburg to defendant Cook which states “Confidential Settlement Communication” and enclosed Mr. Bonowitz’s schematic for removal of plaster walls at the property. • Exhibit B is a recent email chain concerning the deposition of Mr. Bonowitz. • Exhibit C is an email dated 9/26/17, with the subject line “Confidential Settlement Communication.” • Exhibit D are two emails dated 10/4/17 between defendant Cook and Greenburg with the subject line “Confidential Settlement Communication.” • Exhibit E is an email dated 8/8/18 from Mr. Greenburg to CSAA adjustor Vicki Miller with the subject line “Confidential Settlement Communication”, attaching Mlynar’s contractor/architect’s [Avelar] repair estimate and scope of work. • Exhibit F is a partial copy of the subpoena served on Mr. Bonowitz in 2023 by CEA. • Exhibit G is a letter dated 8/7/18 from Mr. Greenburg to CSAA. II. OPPOSITION BY CEA The opposition sets out four arguments: (1) Mr. Bonowitz was Mlynar’s engineeringconsultant during the presentation of the earthquake claim – not during the lawsuit and he wasnot retained in anticipation of the appraisal proceeding; (2) Mr. Bonowitz’s testimony is notrelated to a settlement offer or demand. He is expected to confirm his 2018 writing in which headvised Mlynar there was no structural damage to her property due to the earthquake; (3) theresults of Mr. Bonowitz’s destructive testing of the framing beneath the plaster walls at Mlynar’sproperty was intended to be shared with CSAA, which was adjusting the claim; and (4) to theextent there was an attorney-work product protection of Mr. Bonowitz’s testimony, Mlynarwaived such protections when her attorneys did not object to the production of his entire file inresponse to a subpoena. III. DISCUSSION Page 2 of 6 Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.420, subdivision (a) states, “[b]efore, during, orafter a deposition, any party, any deponent, or any other affected natural person or organizationmay promptly move for a protective order. The motion shall be accompanied by a meet andconfer declaration under Section 2016.040.” Subdivision (b) states, in part, “[t]he court, for goodcause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party, deponent, or othernatural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, orundue burden and expense.” California Evidence Code section 1152, Admissibility of Evidence subdivision (a) states,in part, that “[e]vidence that a person has, in compromise or from humanitarian motives,furnished or offered or promised to furnish money or any other thing, act, or service to anotherwho has sustained or will sustain or claims that he or she has sustained or will sustain loss ordamage, as well as any conduct or statements made in negotiation thereof, is inadmissible toprove his or her liability for the loss or damage or any part of it.” First, the emails referenced by Mlynar, though titled “Confidential SettlementCommunications” do not appear to include any specific offers to settle her claim. Second, CEApoints out that this section of the Evidence Code pertains to the admissibility of evidence, anddoes not reference limiting the scope of a deposition. Mlynar has not provided a basis for herassertion that Evidence Code section 1152 insulates the deposition testimony of a third-partywitness. Further, even assuming any protections existed for Mr. Bonowitz’s work and testimony,there have been multiple instances of waiver. “[T]he attorney work product privilege is subject tothe same waiver principles applied to the attorney-client privilege. ‘Waiver of work productprotection, though not expressly defined by statute, is generally found under the same set ofcirc*mstances as waiver of the attorney-client privilege—by failing to assert the protection, bytendering certain issues, and by conduct inconsistent with claiming the protection. Waiveralso occurs by an attorney's voluntary disclosure or consent to disclosure of the writing to aperson other than the client who has no interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the contentsof the writing.’[Citations.] Thus disclosure to a third party will waive the work product privilegeunless the disclosure was coerced.” (Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2008)165 Cal. App. 4th 672, 678-679.) (Emphasis added.) In March 2023, CEA subpoenaed Mr. Bonowitz’s files related to his work at Mlynar’sproperty and a copy of the subpoena was served on her counsel. Mr. Bonowitz produced thedocuments requested. Mlynar did not object. (Dec. of Amato ¶ 3.) His deposition was noticed forApril 24, 2024, with all counsel, including Mlynar’s attorney, copied and again, Mlynar did notobject. (Dec. of Amato at ¶ 5, Ex. 4.) Finally, Mr. Bonowitz’s site visit notes were already Page 3 of 6disseminated as exhibits to a deposition of plaintiff’s contractor and as an exhibit to CEA’smotion for summary judgment. The motion is denied. The court declines to award sanctions. PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE FILED 7/18/24 1. Order on Motion for Summary Judgment in this case. Denied. The court need not take judicial notice of records in its own case file. 2. Declaration of Janet Mlynar in support of her Responses to Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts of Defendants CSAA Insurance Exchange and California Earthquake Authority in Support of their Motions for Summary Judgment and/or Adjudication. Denied. The court need not take judicial notice of records in its own case file. 3. Declaration of Jon-Marc Dobrin in Support of Plaintiff’s Responses to Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts of Defendants CSAA Insurance Exchange and California Earthquake Authority in Support of their Motions for Summary Judgment and/or Adjudication. Denied. The court need not take judicial notice of records in its own case file. 4. Plaintiff Janet Mlynar’s Response to Undisputed Material Facts of Defendants CSAA Insurance Exchange and California Earthquake Authority in Support of their Motions for Summary Judgment and/or Adjudication. Denied. The court need not take judicial notice of records in its own case file. PLAINTIFF JANET MLYNAR’S ADDENDUM TO REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE FILED 7/30/24 Ex. UU Redacted emails and report of defendants’ appraiser, Thad Eaton. Denied. PLAINTIFF JANET MLYNAR’S SECOND ADDENDUM REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE FILED 8/9/24 Ex. A copies of CSAA’s claim file produced in this action regarding CSAA’s redacted communications with its contractors Shaun Piazza and its engineer Peter Shandlin and the “Confidential Settlement Communication” from Mlynar’s attorney Greenburg with CSAA adjustor Vikki Miller. Denied.Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal orderincorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating thetentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, inaccordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the Page 4 of 6prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative issimply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition ofsanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed.

Ruling

Hunter, et al. vs. Elo, et al.

Aug 19, 2024 |23CV-0201716

HUNTER, ET AL. VS. ELO, ET AL.Case Number: 23CV-0201716This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of the case. The Court has reviewed the Status ConferenceStatement filed by Plaintiffs which requests that this hearing be continued due to Defendant Allison Marie Elo’spossible bankruptcy filing. The Court notes that Notice of Bankruptcy has not been filed with the Court. Thematter is continued to Monday, December 16, 2024 at 9:00 a.m. in Department 63 for review regarding statusof the case. No appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

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